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Free to Choose?
Reform, Choice, and Consideration Sets in the English
National Health Service
By Martin Gaynor and Carol Propper and Stephan Seiler∗
Choice in public services is controversial. We exploit a reform in
the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing
constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that
explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on
patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more respon-
sive to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality
and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of de-
mand faced by hospitals increased substantially post-reform and we
find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by
improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality.
JEL: D12, I11, I18, L13, L30
Keywords: Demand Estimation, Non-price Competition, Health
Economics, Patient Choice, Health Care Reform
Governments facing fiscal pressure have increasingly turned to proposals to cre-
ate or enhance consumer choice for public services (see, e.g., Besley and Ghatak
2003, Blo¨chliger 2008, Hoxby 2003, Le Grand 2003). In health care, choice is a
popular reform model adopted by administrations of different political orienta-
tions in many countries, including the US, the UK, Denmark, Italy (Lombardy),
the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. The belief is that by increasing choice
for patients, providers of care or insurers will become more responsive to patient
demand, which in turn will drive greater efficiency in the delivery and funding of
health care. However, whether enhanced patient choice will make hospital choice
more responsive to quality is not well established, although the consequences of
poor quality in health care can be dire. Patients’ health can be severely com-
promised by poor quality care, including, as we show below, an increased risk of
death. Thus there is a need to understand the responses of health care consumers
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when they are offered more choice. This is exactly the issue we address here.
To do this we exploit a reform which introduced patient choice and tie this
to the estimation of a structural demand model that explicitly incorporates the
institutional features of the reform. This enables us to identify the effect of
increasing choice on patient behavior. We use the model to quantify the gains
from the reform in terms of patient welfare and survival and to analyze how the
changes in patients’ choices translate into changes in the competitive environment
faced by hospitals.
The reform we exploit is from the English National Health Service (NHS). In
2006, the UK government mandated that patients in the English NHS had to
be offered a choice of 5 hospitals when referred by their physician to a hospital
for treatment. Prior to this reform, there was no requirement that patients be
offered choice. The reform provides exogenous variation in the ability to exercise
choice over time and, as the choice set of hospitals is (almost) constant around the
introduction of the choice reform, allows us to cleanly identify the effect of greater
choice while holding the underlying market structure fixed. We use this reform to
estimate a structural model of demand under both pre-reform constrained choice
and post-reform liberated choice.
In the post-reform period we assume that, as patients were mandated free
choice, the choices made by the referring physician fully reflect patient preferences
over hospital characteristics (quality of care, waiting time, travel distance). Pre-
reform, patient choice was constrained. We do not observe the choice sets available
to patients. Therefore, to model hospital choice pre-reform we adopt an approach
which draws from the consideration set literature (see, e.g., Goeree 2008, Mehta,
Rajiv and Srinivasan 2003). We model the patient’s choice set as containing
a subset of the full set of available options. This subset is determined by the
physician’s preferences, which were shaped by the institutional structure of the
pre-reform referral system. Specifically, in the pre-reform period referrals were
paid for by a selective contracting system that covered referrals to only a subset
of all potential hospitals. This system, discussed in detail in Section I.B below,
made it easier for a physician to refer patients to hospitals located within local
administrative boundaries. Exploiting these institutional features, we estimate
the extent to which the referring physician cares about patient welfare by allowing
him to offer a (potentially limited) set of hospitals from which the patient chooses
the one with the highest utility according to her preferences.1 This allows us to
identify the extent to which patients were constrained pre-reform. To estimate
the model we take the case of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. This
is well suited to our purpose as most CABGs are elective and scheduled well in
advance, giving patients an opportunity to exercise choice if allowed to do so.2
1The model nests the extreme cases of unconstrained and fully constrained choice, where in the latter
case the physician offers only a singleton choice set, his preferred hospital, to the patient.
2A relatively small proportion of CABG surgeries are performed on an emergency basis. We exclude
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We begin by providing descriptive evidence to show that, while on average
distance travelled changed little post-reform, there is clear evidence of improved
sorting of patients to higher quality hospitals after the reform. Furthermore, we
see these patterns only for elective cases but not for emergencies, suggesting that
choice is the key driver. We then estimate the structural model and use the esti-
mates to quantify the impact of the reform. First, we analyze the direct impact
of the removal of constraints on the ability of patients to choose a hospital ac-
cording to their preferences. This leads to a reallocation of patients to higher
quality hospitals and thus an improvement in patient welfare and expected sur-
vival. We find a modest decrease in patient mortality of around 3.5 more patients
per year (approximately a 3 percent decrease) had patients had free choice in
the pre-reform period. The utility increase for the average patient as a result of
the reform is equivalent to that from about a 50 percent reduction in the travel
distance to a hospital. This is relatively large: since prices in the NHS are zero,
distance and waiting time are the main costs of getting treatment. We also find
that the quality elasticity of demand increased for all types of patients. The de-
mand elasticity increased relatively more for sicker and lower income patients.
The latter effect is particularly interesting because there have been concerns ex-
pressed about the impacts of pro-choice policies on the poor (see, e.g., Cookson,
Laudicella and Donni 2013). We do not find these to be substantiated here.
Second, we analyze the change in the competitive environment in the hospital
market. To quantify the effect on competition, we aggregate the patient-level
elasticities to the hospital level and find that the competitive environment changed
substantially. For the average hospital an increase in mortality leads to a five-
times larger drop in market share post-reform relative to pre-reform. This lends
support to the notion that hospitals had stronger incentives to improve quality due
to the introduction of patient choice. Finally, we analyze the supply-side response
to the reform and find that hospitals which experienced the largest increase in
elasticity also had the biggest reduction in their mortality rates.
Our paper makes a contribution to two distinct literatures. The first is the
impact of pro-competitive and choice based reforms on the quality of health care
provision. Kessler and McClellan (2000) provided initial evidence on the effect
of competition on quality in the US Medicare program. The literature on health
care competition and quality in the US has grown greatly since then. The over-
whelming majority of these papers take non-structural approaches. Gaynor and
Town (2012) and Gaynor, Ho and Town (2015) survey those papers and their
results. Most (but not all) papers find that competition leads to enhanced qual-
ity. In the UK context, the primary analyses of the impact of the 2006 reforms
on patient outcomes are Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and Propper (2013) and Cooper
et al. (2011). They estimate reduced form models of changes in hospital mortality
those from our main analysis and use them as a placebo test for the robustness of our results. We provide
factual details on CABGs in Section I.A.
4 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
outcomes regressed on measures of market concentration. Both papers find that
patient outcomes at the hospital level improved and conclude that competition
and choice improved quality.
Our paper advances the prior literature by explicitly modeling the choice pro-
cess before and after the reform, allowing us to estimate the extent of constraints
pre-reform. The nature of our structural model allows us to carefully decompose
the effect of the reform along various dimensions. As mentioned above, we first
quantify the changes in patient mortality and utility from the reallocation of pa-
tients to better hospitals following the liberation of choice. Second, we assess the
effect on supply-side incentives. We compute the change in hospital elasticities
with respect to quality after the reform and assess whether hospitals reacted to
the change in the competitive environment by improving their quality (by low-
ering mortality rates). The small number of earlier papers primarily focuses on
just the last part of this assessment: hospitals’ reactions to the reform in terms
of quality improvements. We provide a much more comprehensive picture of the
impact of increasing choice. Furthermore, while there is a large literature esti-
mating demand models in health care, either directly or as part of a larger model
(e.g., of hospital competition), these papers are not typically able to separately
identify patient versus physician preferences due to a lack of sources of identify-
ing variation.3,4 The setting we study provides us with a unique opportunity to
identify patient preferences separately from physician preferences because of the
change in the choice process due to the removal of constraints.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the literature on consideration set formation,
for example Roberts and Lattin (1991), Andrews and Srinivasan (1995), Bron-
nenberg and Vanhonacker (1996), Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan (2003), Goeree
(2008), and Seiler (2013). We add to this literature by exploiting a unique aspect
of our data: the fact that we observe a change in the process by which consider-
ation sets are formed. In particular, observing unconstrained choice post-reform
allows us to estimate preferences in a setting where constraints had no impact on
choice. Given those preference estimates, we then use choices in the pre-reform
period to estimate the process driving the consideration set formation. Within
the health care literature, Ho (2006) and Dafny, Ho and Varela (2013) also an-
alyze the effect of removing choice constraints. However, in their settings the
constrained choice sets are observed in the data and the papers evaluate the wel-
fare effect of their removal in a counterfactual. We observe a change in the way
consideration sets are formed due to the reform, but as the precise choice sets
being offered are not observed we have to infer the constraining process from the
3Luft et al. (1990), Tay (2003), and Howard (2005) are examples of demand estimation for the US.
Sivey (2008), Beckert, Christensen and Collyer (2012), Varkevisser, van der Geest and Schut (2012),
and Moscone, Tosetti and Vittadini (2012) are examples for Europe. Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite
(2003), Gaynor and Vogt (2003), and Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) are examples of choice
estimation within the context of models of hospital competition.
4Beckert (2015) proposes a methodological approach to identifying patient vs physician preferences.
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choice data.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the institutional set-
ting. Section II outlines the modeling framework. Section III describes the data
and Section IV presents econometric issues and estimation methods. Section V
presents reduced-form results followed by Section VI, which presents the results
from the structural estimation. Section VII quantifies the impact of the reform
along various dimensions using our model estimates. The final section contains
concluding remarks.
I. Institutional Details
A. CABG: Medical Background
A coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) is a surgical procedure widely used
to treat coronary heart disease. It is used for people with severe angina (chest
pain due to coronary heart disease) or who are at high risk of a heart attack. It
diverts blood around narrowed or clogged parts of the major arteries to improve
blood flow and oxygen supply to the heart. It involves taking a blood vessel from
another part of the body, usually the chest or leg, and attaching it to the coronary
artery above and below the narrowed area or blockage. This new blood vessel,
known as a graft, diverts the flow of blood around the part of the coronary artery
that is narrowed or blocked.5 Successful bypass surgery improves symptoms and
lowers the risk of heart attack.
We focus on CABG for three reasons. First, it is a commonly performed proce-
dure. About 13,500 patients per year receive elective CABGs in England, making
CABG one of the most frequently performed elective treatments.6 The fact that it
is commonly performed provides us with statistical power and means that CABG
is quantitatively important. Second, CABG is mostly performed on an elective,
as opposed to an emergency, basis. Therefore, patients can exercise choice among
alternatives, which is not usually the case for emergency treatments. Third, pa-
tients who receive heart bypass surgery are very sick, so CABG is among the most
risky elective treatments and mortality is a fairly common outcome.7 The rela-
tively high frequency of death means mortality is a reliable and easily observed
measure of quality. Other dimensions of quality which characterize other medical
procedures are harder to observe and may be less reliably recorded.
Patients in the NHS who present with symptoms of coronary artery disease or
5http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Coronary-artery-bypass/Pages/Introduction.aspx
6In the US the number is 415,000, making CABG one of the top 10 most common non-obstetric
surgical procedures (National Hospital Discharge Survey 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhds/nhds_
products.htm).
7Other procedures commonly used in the health economics literature, such as AMI (acute myocardial
infarction) treatment have higher mortality rates, but are primarily emergency treatments. They are
therefore not directly relevant for an analysis of patient choice.
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angina are referred to a cardiologist in a hospital who conducts tests and may
then perform a non-surgical procedure to unblock the artery (called angioplasty
or percutaneous coronary intervention, PCI). If this fails, the patient will then
be referred for a CABG to be performed by a cardiac surgeon and put on an
elective waiting list for this treatment. Cardiologists operate in almost all short
term general NHS hospitals but CABGs are performed only at a limited number
of hospitals. The referral is typically made by the cardiologist but in some cases
may be made by the patient’s primary care physician (the General Practitioner).8
B. The Choice Reform
In the UK health care is tax financed and free at the point of use. Almost all
care is provided by the National Health Service (NHS). Primary care is provided
in the community by publicly funded physicians known as General Practitioners
(GPs). GPs are self employed and work in practices which on average contain
4 to 5 GPs. They earn their income by providing services to the NHS. Patients
have a very limited choice of GP.9 GPs also act as gatekeepers for hospital-based
(known as secondary) care, sending patients who need treatment to a specific
hospital. Secondary care (including cardiology and cardiac surgery) is provided
in publicly funded (NHS) hospitals. NHS hospitals are free-standing public or-
ganizations known as NHS Trusts. In these hospitals, the physicians are salaried
employees and are generally employed only in one NHS Trust. Publicly funded
bodies covering specific geographic areas, called Primary Care Trusts (PCTs),
have the task of buying hospital-based health care for their population on behalf
of the GP practices in their area. In the period we examine, PCTs also over-
saw the GP practices in their area, monitoring their prescribing, inspecting their
premises, providing financial assistance for practice computing, financing com-
munity nurses to complement GP services and providing information to practices
to allow them to compare their performance with other practices in the PCT.
On average each PCT had around 20 or so GP practices in their area (Santos,
Gravelle and Propper 2015).
In the pre-reform period, when purchasing hospital based care, buyers (PCTs)
and sellers (the NHS Trusts) negotiated over price, service quality (mainly wait-
ing times rather than clinical outcomes) and volume on an annual basis. The
majority of contracts were annual bulk-purchasing contracts between the buyers
and a limited number of sellers. Patients requiring secondary care were generally
referred by their GPs to the local hospital that provided the service they required
and were not offered choice over which hospital they went to. Instead the hospital
to which a patient was sent was determined by the selective contracts negotiated
by the PCTs on behalf of all the GPs in their area and covering all the patients
8Payment for the treatment is discussed in the next section.
9Patients almost always have to choose a GP located near to where they live. There are currently
(as of 2016) proposals to increase choice.
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registered with these GPs.10 PCTs had to make additional, separate, payments
for any referrals physicians made to non-contracted hospitals. Thus GPs whose
patients were referred off-contract were likely to be subject to scrutiny by, and
discussions with, the PCT about their behavior. In the choice of hospitals with
which to contract, PCTs had a strong tendency to support local providers, i.e.,
ones that fell within their geographical boundaries. This was for both historic
reasons (PCTs and hospitals had, pre-1991, been joint administrative entities)
and to assure local supply of care. So for these contractual reasons physicians
were more likely to refer patients to the nearby hospital(s) with which their PCT
had negotiated a contract.
From late 2002 the government started to develop the components of a reform
package intended to bring about hospital competition from 2006 onwards.11 There
were several elements to this policy. First, under law, after January 2006 patients
had to be offered a choice of five providers for where they had their hospital care
(Farrar et al. 2007). GPs were required (and provided with software) to ensure
that patients were made aware of, and offered, choice.
Second, the government introduced a new information system that enabled
paperless referrals and appointment bookings and provided information on the
different dimensions of service (waiting times and some measures of clinical qual-
ity) to help patients make more informed choices. This system, known as “Choose
and Book,” allows patients to book hospital appointments online, with their GP,
or by telephone. The booking interface gave the person booking the appoint-
ment the ability to search for hospitals based on geographic distance and to see
estimates of each hospital’s waiting time. From 2007 the government also intro-
duced a website designed to provide further information to help patients’ choices.
This included information collected by the national hospital accreditation bodies,
such as risk-adjusted mortality rates and detailed information on waiting times,
infection rates and hospital activity rates for particular procedures, as well as
information on hospital accessibility, general visiting hours and parking arrange-
ments (http://www.chooseandbook.nhs.uk/).
Third, from 2006 onwards the NHS adopted a payment system in which hospi-
tals were paid fixed, regulated, prices for treating patients (a regulated price sys-
tem similar to the Medicare hospital payment system in the US). This fixed price
system covered around 70% of hospital services, including CABG. This change in
the remuneration system meant that GPs (and hospital specialists making refer-
rals for treatment to a hospital other than their own) were no longer restricted in
these referral decisions by their PCT’s contractual arrangements with individual
hospitals.12
10Almost all patients in the PCT will be registered with a GP in the PCT.
11A previous hospital competition policy had operated 1991-1997 but was dropped when the Labour
government came to power in 1997 (Propper 2012).
12The reforms also promoted the use of (mainly) new private providers of care. However, use of these
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In the particular case of CABG, which is a specialized treatment provided at
only a few hospitals, the Choose and Book information system was probably less
important than for more routine treatments. What was more important was
the removal of selective contracting and the right to choose. These allowed the
patient to choose, with the aid of their GP, the initial hospital in which to see a
cardiologist, and gave the cardiologist freedom in where they sent patients for a
CABG. In these choices the patient, and the physicians involved, were no longer
restricted in their decisions by selective contracting.
It is important to note that the reforms did not change financial incentives for
the patient or financial payments to referring physicians. Patients did not pay for
medical care either before or after the reforms. Neither GPs nor hospital based
specialists (including cardiologists) received payments that were linked to their
referral advice to the patient, either before or after the reform. However, the
reform did have a financial impact on PCTs, which were overseeing GPs, and
pre-reform had an interest in referring patients to hospitals that were covered
by contractual arrangements. Therefore, by ending selective contracting, what
the reforms did was to remove legal and (indirect) financial restrictions on both
physicians and patients which enabled referral decisions to be more flexible and
tailored to individual patients.
It is possible that patient preferences influenced referral decisions even before
the formal introduction of patient choice. For instance, a well-informed patient
with a strong preference might have been able to convince the physician to refer
her to a specific hospital. The effect of the reforms was to make such choice
available and far more explicit for all patients. Similarly, physician agency might
have led to referrals pre-reform which were in line with patient preferences al-
though not directly selected by the patient. However, the nature of selective con-
tracting suggests that physician incentives were not fully aligned with patients’
interests. In particular, contractual arrangements made by PCTs with nearby
hospitals made referrals outside that set of hospitals substantially more difficult
pre-reform. Rather than assuming that patients were constrained pre-reform, we
let the data tell us the extent to which patient preferences influenced choice in the
pre-reform period. In the econometric model we explicitly estimate the degree to
which patient preferences were constrained before the reform, thus allowing for
less than fully constrained choices.
II. Modeling Approach
Our framework for analyzing the impact of the reforms on hospital demand
is comprised of two components: (1) a model of patient choice under the post-
was very limited and accounted for less than 1% of all NHS care during the period in which we analyze.
The main services purchased in the private sector were simple elective services (primarily hip and knee
replacements and cataract removal) rather than complex interventions such as CABG or cardiac care
more generally.
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reform regime where choice was liberated and (2) a representation of the process
by which choice was constrained before the reform.
A. Patient Preferences
In the post-reform period, when choice is liberated, we assume that referrals
reflect choice from the full set of hospitals that perform CABG surgery based
on patients’ utility from this choice.13 We note that in the case of a complex
procedure such as CABG, patients will typically seek and follow advice from
their referring physician. We make the key assumption that after the reform, the
physician acts as a perfect agent for his patient by providing her with information
and advice based on his best understanding of the patient’s preferences. We make
this assumption based on the institutional features described above. Specifically,
neither the GP nor the cardiologist have any incentive post-reform not to act
in the patient’s best interest. They do not receive payments linked to where
they refer and they are no longer bound by selective contracting. Furthermore,
physicians were mandated to explicitly involve patients in the decision-making
process by offering them choice from a set of hospitals. Both of these aspects
of the reform together are the reason for assuming that post-reform referrals are
based solely on patient preferences.
Price in the NHS is zero for the consumer, so utility is only a function of patient
and hospital characteristics. The key factors which affect hospital choice are the
quality of care, the amount of time a patient has to wait for surgery, and distance
from the hospital. We also allow for preference heterogeneity across different
patient characteristics. Finally, we assume that all people who require a CABG
are sick enough that they get one (after a wait). As a consequence, there is no
outside good.14
Let a patient i obtain the following utility from choosing hospital j:
(1) Uij = βwiWjt + βziZjt + f(Dij) + ξj + εij
where Wjt denotes the average waiting time for a CABG at hospital j in time
period t, Zjt denotes the quality of clinical care at the hospital in that time period,
13There are only 29 (both pre- and post-reform) hospitals in England which offer CABGs and all treat
a fairly large number of cases on a regular basis. We confirmed, from independent sources, that we cover
the exhaustive set of possible CABG providers. So it is not the case that some options are excluded from
the analysis because they were never chosen during the sample period. Further, while physicians were
only required to offer patients the choice of 5 hospitals post-reform, they were able to refer to any hospital
that performs CABGs. A non-negligible fraction of patients receive treatment at a hospital other than
one of the 5 closest hospitals. We therefore assume in estimation that all 29 hospitals are available to all
patients.
14This assumption is common in the healthcare literature. Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003)
and Ho (2006) (among others) make the same assumption when estimating demand models for hospital
choice.
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andDij is the distance from patient i’s location to the location of hospital j.
15 The
function f(Dij) is a transformation of Dij that reflects the (non-linear) preference
for distance to the hospital. ξj denotes unobserved hospital quality and εij is an
idiosyncratic taste shock that is iid extreme value. We incorporate preference
heterogeneity by allowing the coefficients on waiting times and mortality (βwi
and βzi) to vary with patient characteristics.
B. Constraints on Patient Choice
To model the fact that choice before the reform was limited, we assume that
pre-reform, physicians offered their patients a limited set of options. This re-
ferral behavior was determined by their own utility, which we model based on
the institutional features of the pre-reform contractual arrangement and referral
process described in Section I.B. As explained, for contractual reasons physicians
were more likely to refer patients to the nearby hospital(s) with which their PCT
had negotiated a contract and discouraged from referring elsewhere. In addition,
physicians were likely to have preferences for referrals to certain hospitals based
on past interactions with the hospital or particular surgeons at the hospital. We
capture these referral incentives by making physician utility a function of hospital
fixed effects and distance related variables as well as an indicator for whether the
hospital was located in the PCT of the referring GP.
More formally, we define the utility the physician receives from referring patient
i to hospital j as
(2) Vij = g(Dij) + ζj + νij
where g(Dij) is a transformation of Dij that reflects the (non-linear) preference
for distance to the hospital which facilitates referrals.16 ζj denotes unobserved
(to the econometrician) physicians’ assessment of hospital quality and νij is an id-
iosyncratic shock that is iid extreme value. Note that, for simplicity of exposition,
we index the physician’s utility by the index i of the patient he is referring. This
has a close mapping to our data: the physician’s influence via offering a limited
set of hospitals constitutes a latent process and is not directly observable. In the
data we only see the referral outcome for patient i. We maintain this notation
for the remainder of the paper.
Details of the specific variables included in physician and patient utility are pro-
15Note that strictly speaking utility has a t subscript because hospital characteristics vary over time.
However, we observe each patient only once and every patient i has a unique time-period t associated
with his referral. We therefore denote the utility function above as patient/hospital but not time-period-
specific (Uij).
16The indicator for whether the hospital is located in the PCT of the referring GP is included in
g(Dij).
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vided in the estimation section (Section IV). In brief, to implement the approach
discussed here, we include only aspects of the hospital that the physician directly
cares about in the physician’s utility function. The preferences physicians are
likely to have for referrals to certain hospitals based on contractual relationships
or past interactions are captured through the set of hospital fixed effects (ζj) as
well as a dummy for whether the hospital is located in the physician’s PCT. Im-
portantly, waiting times and quality are not included in physician utility, as we
think of those variables as influencing the physician’s decision only indirectly via
their influence on patient utility.
Contrary to a standard choice model, we assume that the physician is not
ultimately making the decision of which hospital to visit, but offers a set of
options from which the patient chooses the highest utility one according to his
preferences. More specifically, we assume that the physician includes hospital k
in the consideration set, that is the (potentially limited) set of hospitals patients
can choose from, if
(3) Vik ≥ maxj∈J(Vij)− λi
where λi ≥ 0 and J denotes the full set of hospitals. In other words, every
hospital that is within a distance of λi (in utility space) relative to the highest
utility option is included in the consideration set. The highest utility hospital
is always included, and the number of options included in the set increases the
higher is the value of λi.
The particular value of the constraining parameter λi captures the extent to
which the physician cares about patient utility and allows the patient’s preferences
to influence choice. In the case of λi = 0, the physician picks the highest utility
option according to his preferences and the patient’s preferences have no bearing
on the choice. In this case, the consideration set formation process collapses to
a discrete choice model based on physician preferences. For λi > 0 the physician
might include multiple hospitals in the choice set. Whether and how many are
included depends on the specific value of λi as well as how similar the utilities of all
hospitals are to each other. λi is a parameter to be estimated and the main driver
of consideration set size. In order to allow for the reform to differentially affect
different groups of patients we allow λi to vary across patient characteristics.
A few comments on this way of modeling the consideration set process are in
order. We believe that our approach reflects actual decision-making well and at
the same time is parsimonious, in the sense that we are able to model the degree
to which patient preferences are constrained through one parameter: λ. Our
framework is different from other approaches in the literature due largely to the
nature of the forces constraining patient choice. In the consideration set literature
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in consumer goods markets the limited nature of choice sets usually originates
from limited information acquisition.17 Instead, in our case, the constraining force
is the joint-decision making process, which involves the patient and physician and
in which the physician had a dominant role before the liberation of choice.18
The paper closest to ours is Goeree (2008), who models the effect of advertising
on consumer’s consideration sets. However, our modeling approach is different in
a few key aspects. In contrast to our paper, Goeree (2008) models the probability
of inclusion into the choice set separately for each product. This implies that the
inclusion probabilities are independent across products. This is not the case in
our setting, where a change in physician utility for one hospital can influence the
inclusion probabilities of other hospitals. A second difference is that her setup
allows for a strictly positive probability of an empty consideration set, which is
not permitted in our model (patients have to be offered the choice of at least
one hospital). Both features are appropriate in the context of advertising and
personal computer purchases, but less attractive for our setting. First, our model
assures that a patient needing a CABG will be offered the choice of at least
one hospital. Second, it seems reasonable that the characteristics of all available
hospitals shape the consideration set size and composition. In our model, the
presence of a particularly attractive option can lead to a smaller choice set by
“pushing” other hospitals out of the consideration set. For instance, a hospital at
10 kilometers distance is less likely to be included if another hospital exists that
is located at a distance of only 5 kilometers.19
Finally, an alternative modeling approach we could take would be to have ex-
pected patient utility directly enter the physician’s utility function. However,
expected patient utility is defined over all possible consideration set permuta-
tions, of which there are 229 − 1 (= 536, 870, 911) for 29 available options. This
approach would therefore require us to write down physician utility over all the
possible one billion compositions of the consideration set. Instead, our frame-
work allows us to compute utility for each option separately and then derive the
consideration set based on this set of utilities and the value of λ. This approach
considerably decreases the computational burden and thereby makes the estima-
tion of the model feasible.
17Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan (2003), Kim, Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010) and Honka (2014)
model the consumer’s decision to gather information in a model of consumer search. Our case is less com-
parable with models of consumer search and has more in common with the case of external information
provision, such as in Goeree (2008), in the sense that patients do not actively influence the formation of
consideration sets.
18For other papers which allow for an agent to be involved in the choice process see Baker, Bundorf
and Kessler (2015) for an empirical examination and Beckert (2015) for an econometric model.
19More generally, increasing the utility of the highest utility hospital (holding everything else constant)
will increase the maximum utility level. As a consequence fewer hospitals will tend to be within λ distance
in utility-space from the highest utility hospital. This mechanism will lead to a smaller consideration
set.
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the UK Department of Health’s Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES) dataset, which is an administrative dataset containing information on every
English NHS hospital inpatient admission. The data contain details of the medical
procedures which the patient received (classified according to OPCS codes20) and
up to 14 diagnoses, classified according to the ICD-10 classification.21 We have
data on the universe of inpatient discharges receiving CABG surgery from every
hospital in the NHS in England from April 2003 to March 2008, corresponding
to the UK financial years 2003 to 2007. About 25% of all CABGs are performed
as part of an emergency treatment and are excluded from the main analysis.
This gives us approximately 13,500 elective CABG discharges performed at 29
hospitals per year. We define January 2004 until March 2005 as the pre-reform
time period and January 2007 to March 2008 as the post-reform time period due
to the fact that the reform was phased in gradually over 2005 and 2006. We
provide more detail on the specific timing of the introduction of the reform in
online Appendix A.
HES contains information on the postal code of the neighborhood in which the
patient lives and patient characteristics such as age, sex, and co-morbidities.22 At
the patient-level we observe the time elapsed between the referral and the actual
treatment, i.e. the patient’s waiting time. We also observe whether the patient
died (in the hospital) within 30 days of the treatment. We can therefore compute
hospital level CABG-specific waiting times and mortality rates by aggregating the
data at the hospital level over the relevant time period. Finally, from the hospital
location and the patient’s postcode, we compute the distance to the hospital. A
list of sources for the data is in online Appendix E.
A. Measuring Clinical Quality of Care
We need to define an appropriate measure for the quality of clinical service. Due
to the relatively high risk of death following a CABG procedure, we assume the
survival probability at a specific hospital is the primary quality metric patients
care about. We thus use mortality rates as a quality measure.
One might be concerned that mortality rates do not correctly reflect differ-
ences in survival probabilities due to differences in case-mix across hospitals. We
therefore implement an empirical test to assess the role of case-mix differences
across hospitals, which we describe in detail in online Appendix B. In summary,
20OPCS is a procedural classification for the coding of operations, procedures and interventions per-
formed in the NHS. It is comparable to the CPT codes used for procedural classification in the US.
21These are the 10th version of the International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes and are the
standard codes used internationally for diagnoses.
22Co-morbidities are additional diagnoses associated with greater sickness, for example, a CABG
patient who is also a diabetic.
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we regress mortality (at the individual level) on a set of hospital dummies which
we instrument with distance to each hospital, following similar approaches by
Gowrisankaran and Town (1999) and Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003).23
Importantly, this IV estimation approach allows us to test whether case-mix varies
significantly across hospitals by comparing the coefficients on the hospital dum-
mies from an OLS regression (which are equal to the unadjusted mortality rate)
with the estimates from the IV regression via a Hausman test.24 Doing so, we
find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS and IV estimates are
the same. We hence conclude that case-mix differences across hospitals are small
enough not to affect the mortality rates significantly and therefore use the unad-
justed mortality rate as a measure of the clinical quality of the hospital. This is
simpler and avoids introducing another source of error into the estimation from
case-mix adjustment.25
B. Hospital Characteristics
In contrast to many other procedures, CABGs are only offered by a small set of
hospitals. Of around 170 short term general (acute) public hospitals within the
NHS, only 29 hospitals offer bypass operations. There was almost no change in
market structure around the time of the policy reform.26 The choice set faced by
patients is nearly identical before and after the reform, which allows us to separate
the impact of greater choice from a possible change in market structure.27 Figure
1 provides a map of the locations of NHS CABG-performing hospitals. Also,
while in principle patients could choose privately funded treatment, in practice
they did not.28
23This assumes that people do not choose where they live relative to CABG hospitals based on their
unobservable health status. This assumption is universally employed in estimating models of hospital
choice, e.g., Kessler and McClellan (2000), Gowrisankaran and Town (1999), Capps, Dranove and Sat-
terthwaite (2003), Gaynor and Vogt (2003), Ho (2009), Beckert, Christensen and Collyer (2012). We
provide additional evidence for this assumption in the online Appendix.
24We assess the strength of the instruments via F-tests for each of the 284 first stage regressions (one
for each hospital/quarter pair). The instruments are strong: the mean of the F-statistic across all the
regressions is 160.9. See online Appendix B.2 for more details.
25We also note that the point estimates when using an adjusted mortality rate in the demand estima-
tion are very similar to the ones we obtain when using the unadjusted rate (see Table D2 in the online
Appendix). This is consistent with the fact that we fail to reject the equality of the two mortality rates.
26The only changes are: (i) the merger of Hammersmith Hospital and St. Mary’s Hospital, which
became part of Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust in 2007, (ii) the opening of the Essex Cardiotho-
racic Centre at Basildon and Thurrock University Hospitals in July 2007, and (iii) Royal Wolverhampton
Hospital started performing a significant number of CABGs only in the second half of 2004 and is there-
fore excluded from the choice set before that. There are therefore 27 hospitals present in every period of
the data. Table D1 in the online Appendix lists the number of hospitals by quarter.
27Our demand estimation is capable of handling hospital entry and exit but the stable market structure
means we isolate the effect of the change in choice without any potential contamination from change in
market structure.
28During our study period four private providers of CABG surgery operated (all located in London).
However, the cost of CABG surgery is such that any patients who might choose to use a private provider
would have to have purchased private insurance before they were diagnosed with a heart problem. The
four private providers only performed a very small number of CABGs compared to public hospitals (for
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for hospitals by (financial) year over
the period 2003-2007. The average hospital treated about 500 CABG patients
per year, but there is substantial variation in admission rates between hospitals.
The number of admissions decreases slightly over time as does the variance across
hospitals.29 Waiting times fell dramatically over the period. In 2003 and 2004
they were quite long, with averages over 100 days. They decreased substantially
in 2005 due to a government policy enforcing waiting time targets (see Propper
et al. 2008).30 There is considerable variation in waiting times between hospitals,
although somewhat less after 2005. The average mortality rate is approximately
1.3 percent for most years with a slight decline towards the end of the sample
period. There is substantial variation in mortality rates across hospitals in all
years.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
When using the mortality rate and waiting times in the demand estimation,
we aggregate the patient-level data to the hospital-quarter level. This provides
us with variation over time as well as across hospitals. Using January 2004 until
March 2005 as the pre-reform time period and January 2007 to March 2008 as
the post-reform time period, we exploit 10 quarters of data, 5 in the pre- and 5
in the post-reform time-period. Descriptive statistics of the quarterly variation
for this time period are reported in Table D1 in the online Appendix.
C. Patient and Area Characteristics
We measure patient socio-economic status using the Index of Multiple Depri-
vation (IMD) in the small area (the Middle Super Output Area, MSOA) in which
the patient lives. The IMD is a measure of income deprivation of the patient’s
neighborhood and is the best available metric on patient income in our data. This
variable ranks a patient’s local neighborhood from richest to poorest. The range
is 0 to 1, with higher values implying higher deprivation.31 In the estimation we
employ an indicator for whether the IMD in a patient’s neighborhood is below
the median IMD (0.1), i.e., whether their neighborhood is above the median in
example, only 67 CABG proceedures were undertaken in the four private hospitals in 2007). Therefore,
we think that our data captures the full choice set of patients.
29The total number of CABGs in the UK undertaken in our time period fell due to the increased use
of angioplasty (PCI).
30This target policy ran most strongly from 2001-2005 i.e. before the choice reform. It has been
shown that the fall in waiting times was primarily due to efficiency improvements and did not have any
detrimental effect on health outcomes (see Propper et al. 2008).
31The IMD is computed by the government for geographical areas that comprise roughly 7,000 indi-
viduals. Our data are from England only, which on average is richer than the rest of the UK. Effectively
in England the IMD varies over a small range, with most of the sample lying between 0.04 and 0.31 (the
10th and 90th percentile). For more information, see http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/
research/indicesdeprivation/deprivation10/.
16 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
income (since IMD decreases in income). Going forward, we simply refer to this
variable as “income.”
HES provides a list of co-morbidities at the patient-level. We use these to
compute the Charlson index, which weights co-morbidities by their impact on
mortality risk (Charlson et al. 1987). The higher the value the greater the pa-
tient’s risk of mortality (the index for a patient with no co-morbidities has a value
of zero).32 We use an indicator for whether a patient has a Charlson Index above
the median (≥ 1) in the estimation. We refer to this variable as “severity.”
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the patient characteristics described
above. As can be seen, most patients are male and over 60 years of age. There is
considerable variation in patients’ general health status, with a large fraction of
patients for whom several co-morbidities are reported. About 40 percent of pa-
tients have a positive value of the Charlson index. Both income and the Charlson
index are used in the demand estimation to analyze how the reform differentially
affected different groups of patients.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The bottom two rows of Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on the distances
patients travel for their CABG treatments.33 We see that the average patient
traveled a substantial distance (over 30 kilometers) and that there is a great deal
of variation in how far patients traveled for care. It is also notable that there is
very little difference in distance traveled between the pre- and post-reform time
periods. This could occur if patients sorted themselves to better hospitals post-
reform within approximately the same distance. In Section V we provide some
reduced-form evidence that this is the most likely explanation for the lack of a
change in distance traveled.
IV. Structural Estimation
As outlined in the model exposition in Section II, there are two parts of the
model we need to specify: patients’ preferences and the constraining process in
the pre-reform time period. Post-reform, patients’ choices are unconstrained. As
a consequence, utility alone drives the choice of hospital. We first describe uncon-
strained post-reform choice, then move on to pre-reform choice under constraint.
A. Post-Reform (Unconstrained) Choice
Post-reform utility is (as described earlier in equation (1))
32For patients in our sample the index takes on values 0, 1 and (rarely) 2. 60% of patients have a
Charlson Index value of 0.
33We use the patient’s 4 digit postcode available in HES to calculate straight line travel distances.
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(4) Uij = U ij + εij = βwiWjt + βziZjt + f(Dij) + ξj + εij
We define f(·) by allowing distance to enter linearly as well as with an indicator
for whether the hospital was the closest one in the choice set:
f(Dij) = αd1Dij + αd2Closestij ,
where Closestij is a dummy equal to one if hospital j is the closest one in the
choice set of patient i. In what follows, when we write out the utility function
we continue to use f(Dij) to economize on notation. We estimate unobserved
hospital quality (ξj) by including a set of hospital fixed effects. We also allow
for observable heterogeneity in preferences for both waiting times and quality of
service in the standard way:
βzi = βz + βzXi
βwi = βw + βwXi
where Xi is comprised of observable patient characteristics on income and illness
severity, as described previously in Section III.C.
Based on this utility function, the probability of patient i choosing hospital k
in the post-reform time period is given by
PrUNCONik (Ωpatient) =
exp[U ik(Ωpatient)]∑
j∈J
exp[U ij(Ωpatient)]
where (Ωpatient = βwi, βzi, αd, ξ) is the vector of coefficients to be estimated per-
taining to patient utility and includes the coefficients on waiting times and mor-
tality as well as the interaction terms with observable patient characteristics, the
distance coefficients, and the set of hospital fixed effects. J denotes the uncon-
strained set of all CABG performing hospitals in the UK.34 We denote the proba-
bility as PrUNCON to distinguish it clearly from the pre-reform choice probability
under constraint.
34We do not limit choice sets based on the location of the patient and hence J contains all CABG
performing hospitals and does not vary across patients.
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B. Pre-Reform (Constrained) Choice
We now describe the process by which patient preferences are constrained prior
to the reform. In particular, physician utility is distinct from patient utility (as
described above, we use the patient index i to describe the physician’s utility with
regard to the referral of patient i to hospital j):
(5) Vij = V ij + νij = g(Dij) + ζj + νij
where g(Dij) is a transformation of Dij that reflects the physician’s preference
for distance to the hospital, ζj is a fixed hospital effect denoting (the physician’s
perception of) hospital quality and νij is an idiosyncratic shock that is iid extreme
value. We operationalize g(Dij) in a similar way as in the patient utility function
by including a linear distance term and a dummy for whether the hospital is the
closest one, while allowing the parameters for doctors to differ from those for
patients. Furthermore, we also include a dummy which is equal to one if the
hospital is located within the PCT of the referring physician to capture the fact
that it is more likely a contractual arrangement exists for any hospital within the
PCT of the GP, thus making a referral to such a hospital easier for the physician
prior to the reform.35
g(Dij) = γd1Dij + γd2Closestij + γd3WithinPCTij ,
The physician’s utility function differs from patient utility in that it does not
depend on waiting time or quality. Nonetheless, hospital quality and waiting
times can affect pre-reform referrals if the physician allows some degree of choice
and therefore the patient is not fully constrained.
We assume that the physician offers multiple hospitals to the patient to choose
from. The physician will include hospital k in the consideration set, that is the
(potentially limited) set of hospitals patients can choose from, if
(6) Vik ≥ maxj∈J(Vij)− λi
where λi ≥ 0 and J denotes the full set of hospitals available. λi is a parameter
to be estimated and the primary driver of consideration set size, i.e., the degree
35As noted above, after the reform such incentives did not exist because contracts with specific hospitals
were replaced with prospective payments.
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to which choice was constrained before the reform. To allow for the reform to
differentially affect different groups of patients we allow for heterogeneity in λi.
Similar to the way we modeled preference heterogeneity we assume
(7) λi = λ+ λXi
where Xi is the same set of variables used to capture patient preference hetero-
geneity, namely the severity of the case and the patient’s income level.36 λi de-
termines the weight of patient (vs. physician) preferences in the decision-making
process. For the case of λi = 0 only the physician’s highest utility hospital is
included in the consideration set, i.e., choice is driven entirely by physician pref-
erences. The consideration set formation process collapses to a discrete choice
model based solely on physician preferences. At the other extreme, as λi grows
larger and → ∞, more hospitals (eventually all) are included in the considera-
tion set and ultimately patients’ preferences are decisive, i.e., patient choices are
not constrained by the physician. The consideration set formation process there-
fore nests both extreme cases of fully constrained and completely unconstrained
choice. We denote the constrained set of hospitals offered by the physician by
CS. The constrained set is a subset of the full choice set (CS ⊆ J) and contains
at least one option (CS 6= ∅).
The probability that patient i is referred to hospital k in time-period t is given
by the product of the probability that hospital k is included in the considera-
tion set by the physician and the probability that the patient picks it from the
consideration set:
PrCONik (Ωpatient,Ωphysician) =
∑
CSk
Pri(CSk|Ωphysician)Pri(k|CSk,Ωpatient)
where CSk denotes all consideration sets that contain hospital k. The second
probability in the equation above is a function of the patient utility parameters
(Ωpatient) and is similar to the post-reform choice process without constraints.
The only difference is that patient preferences determine the choice of hospital
from the subset CSk rather than the full choice set J . This yields the following
conditional choice probability
36As outlined above, we allow patients’ preferences over quality of service and waiting times to vary
with severity and income. Because λi plays the role of constraining patients’ ability to react on their
preferences regarding both waiting times and mortality (see the discussion of identification in Section IV.C
below), we allow the strength of the constraining effect to also vary with the same patient characteristics.
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Pri(k|CSk,Ωpatient) = exp[U ik(Ωpatient)]∑
j∈CSk
exp[U ij(Ωpatient)]
(8)
The consideration sets in our context are unobserved and the probability for
each of the possible sets is driven by the parameters in the physician’s utility
(Ωphysician = γd, λi, ζj):
Pri(CS|Ωphysician) = Pr(Vij∈CS ≥ [maxj∈J(Vij)− λi], Vij /∈CS < [maxj∈J(Vij)− λi]|Ωphysician)
While Pri(k|CSk,Ωpatient) has an analytical expression, the probability of a
particular consideration set occurring has no closed-form solution. For this reason,
we take draws from the distribution of physician taste shocks νij and simulate
the resulting choice sets. We denote a set of taste shock draws for consumer i as
(νi1,si , νi2,si , ...νij,si , ...), where si is an index that denotes one set of simulation
draws for consumer i. Hospital k is contained in the simulated consideration set
C˜Ssi of patient i (for the set of simulation draws si) if
V ik + νik,si ≥ maxj(V ij + νij,si)− λi
For every set of draws, we obtain a different simulated consideration set. Condi-
tional on the simulated consideration set C˜Ssi , we then use Pri(k|C˜Ssi ,Ωpatient)
to determine the choice probability of each hospital in the set. This yields the
simulated choice probability for hospital k of
P˜ rCONik (Ωpatient,Ωphysician) =
1
Si
∑
si
1(k ∈ C˜Ssi)Pri(k|C˜Ssi ,Ωpatient)
where Si is the number of draws and 1(·) is an indicator function for k ∈ C˜Ssi .
Note that Ωphysician influences the choice probability by affecting the probability
of a specific consideration set C˜Ssi occurring. In the case that hospital k is
included in the simulated consideration set, the predicted choice probability is
given by Pri(k|C˜Ssi ,Ωpatient) and depends on the identities of the other hospitals
included in the simulated set. If hospital k is not contained in the simulated
set, the choice probability is equal to zero, which is captured by the indicator
function. Averaging across simulation draws within each patient i yields the
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simulated choice probability.37
The model is estimated by using a simulated method of moments estimator
where we set
∑
i
∑
j
[dij − Prij(Ωpatient,Ωphysician)]zij = 0.
In the equation above dij denotes a dummy variable which is equal to one
for the hospital j patient i was referred to and zero otherwise. Prij denotes
the predicted choice probability ,where Prij = P˜ rCONij if patient i was referred
pre-reform and Prij = Pr
UNCON
ij if the referral occurred post-reform. zij is a
vector of instruments. In our case, the set of instruments is simply equal to a
vector of hospital dummies and characteristics as well as interactions of hospital
and patient characteristics. Specifically, zij contains hospital dummies, distance
to the hospital, a dummy for the closest hospital, a within-PCT dummy and
the two hospital characteristics: quality of service (mortality rate) and waiting
times. The latter two are also included interacted with the severity of the case
and income. Finally, all instruments are included twice, interacted with both a
pre-reform and a post-reform dummy variable.38
C. Identification
In this section we cover the sources of identification for the model. We first
discuss in detail how we separately identify patient and physician preferences.
We then turn to the identification of the specific patient preference parameters
on waiting time and quality of service.
Separate Identification of Patient and Physician Preferences
The key source of identification that allows us to separately identify physician
and patient preferences is the fact that we observe a change in the process by
which consideration sets are formed due to the reform.
It is easiest to think about the logic underpinning our identification strategy
by first considering the identification of patient preferences, which is relatively
standard because we observe a time-period (post-reform) where choice is liber-
37In order to avoid discontinuities which occur for the simple frequency estimator described here, we
implement a kernel-smoothed frequency estimator. More details are provided in online Appendix C.
38The only instrument which appears only for the pre-reform period is the PCT dummy, which only
enters physician utility.
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ated, and hence only patient preferences drive choice.39 This allows us to identify
patient preferences from post-reform choice data.40 Now consider hospital choice
in the pre-reform period. If patient choice pre-reform was unconstrained (and if
patient preferences are stable over time) then the post-reform estimates should
predict hospital choice before the reform. If instead post-reform preferences do
not predict referral patterns in the pre-reform time period, it has to be the case
that the way in which referrals were made changed over time. Based on the in-
stitutional features of the market (see Section I.B), we capture such differences
in referral patterns by assuming that physicians offer patients a limited set of
hospitals to choose from prior to the reform.41
We assume that these constrained choice sets are formed based on two factors.
One is physicians’ preferences over hospital characteristics that directly affect
the convenience of referrals, and hence their utility. Due to the nature of the
contractual arrangements (see Section I.B for details) between referring physicians
and hospitals in the pre-reform period, we assume that distance to the hospital as
well as hospital fixed effects and whether the hospital is in the physician’s PCT
enter physician utility directly. Distance captures the convenience of referrals
and the hospital fixed effects and whether the hospital is in the physician’s PCT
capture the physician’s past experience with a hospital. The preference weights
of these characteristics are identified by the extent to which pre-reform referrals
are responsive to the respective hospital characteristics.
The second is the constraining parameter λ, which is the extent to which the
physician allows patient preferences to influence choice, and is the main driver
of consideration set size. This is identified through the influence of the variables
unique to patient utility on pre-reform choices. The key aspect that helps us
identify λ is therefore an exclusion restriction on waiting times and mortality
rates, which only enter patient utility. Thus, if waiting times and mortality
rates have any impact on choice pre-reform, this can only be rationalized by
patients being less than fully constrained and hence patient preferences affecting
choices even before the reform. The extent to which the sensitivity of referrals to
both of these hospital characteristics is lower pre-reform relative to post-reform
determines the strength of the constraint.
The two key elements that are crucial for identification are the exclusion restric-
tion on waiting times and mortality, which are assumed not to enter physician
utility, and the assumption that patient preferences are stable over time. We now
39As discussed above (Section I.B), we think of this as physicians having an important role providing
information and guiding choice, but acting as patients’ agents post-reform, so that choice reflects patients’
preferences.
40We note that one could estimate the post-reform choice process on its own in the fashion of a
standard random coefficient discrete choice model.
41We note that this identification strategy is different from other models of consideration set formation,
for example Goeree (2008) or Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan (2003), where typically the nature of the
constraining process does not change over time.
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discuss the validity of both assumptions.
Exclusion Restrictions
Technically, a necessary requirement for our model to be identified is that at
least one variable that enters patient utility is excluded from physician utility.
If instead we were to include the identical set of variables in both patient and
physician utility this would leave the constraining parameter λ unidentified. To
see why this is so, note that the role of λ is to rationalize the change in the sen-
sitivity of referrals to waiting times and mortality. Hence, if we included waiting
times and mortality directly in physician utility, then the sensitivity change with
respect to these characteristics could be rationalized either by their weights in
physician preferences or by a different value of λ. Therefore, λ would not be
separately identified.
An alternative way to think about the identification of physician preferences and
constraints is to consider the set of instruments used to identify the parameters of
the constraining process in the pre-reform period (conditional on having identified
patient preferences). As instruments for the pre-reform choice process, we use
the same set of hospital characteristics as those that identify preferences in the
post-reform period. Given our assumption about the behavior of the physician,
hospital dummies and distance respectively serve as instruments for the hospital
fixed effects and distance coefficients that enter physician utility directly. Waiting
time and quality of service (and their interactions with income and severity)
serve as instruments to identify the constraining parameter λ. In the absence
of waiting times and quality entering the physician’s utility function, the only
way to rationalize the observed sensitivity of referrals to those characteristics is
through λ.
Economically, we exclude waiting times and mortality rate from physician util-
ity because physician utility should only contain variables that influence the physi-
cian directly, i.e., those that affect the convenience of referrals. Any variables
that affect the physician because he cares about patients’ health outcomes reflect
physician agency and affect the physician indirectly. We capture these impacts
on physician agency by treating these variables as influencing referrals via a loos-
ening of constraints. In other words, a physician who cares about his patients is
modeled as allowing a greater degree of choice for the patient and hence allowing
patient preferences to influence choice.
We note that our setting is considerably more flexible than extant consideration
set models, which are estimated for situations where the constraining regime does
not change. Without a change in the decision-making process one needs to have a
non-overlapping set of variables enter the preferences and constraints respectively.
Any variable that enters both stages is only identified by functional form, due to
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the fact that choice is always driven by parameters in both stages.42 In our setting
instead, we can estimate preferences from post-reform data and then estimate
the constraining process separately using the pre-reform data. This enables us to
allow for some (but not complete) overlap in the variables that affect consumers’
preferences and constraints. Such an overlap is desirable in our setting where we
believe that some characteristics (such as distance) matter to both patients and
(pre-reform) to physicians and hence should enter the utility functions of both
parties. Our approach allow us to estimate such a model without having to rely
on functional form for identification of variables entering patient and physician
utility.
Finally, we note that we include the “within-PCT” dummy variable only in
physician utility, but not in patient utility, based on the institutional features
described earlier. While this helps with identification, it is not necessary to have
a variable that only influences physician utility.
Stability of Patient Preferences
It is crucial for our identification strategy for patient preferences to be stable
over time, because this allows us to recover patient preferences from post-reform
data and then attribute any change in referral patterns over time to the con-
straining process. If instead, patient preferences pre-reform are different from
post-reform preferences, then we would have to identify both pre-reform patient
preferences and constraints from pre-reform data. We believe that the assumption
of stable patient preferences is reasonable in our context but provide additional
discussion here.
First, we assume that patient preferences regarding waiting times and mortality
do not change over time. This assumption might be violated if the mix of patients
seeking treatment changes over time. We do see a modest increase in patient
severity over time. However, we allow preferences to be a function of severity.
Therefore, as long as the change over time in patient severity is reflected in the
observed severity measure, this does not pose a problem.
Second, we assume that patient preferences over unobserved hospital quality
(ξj) are stable over time. One could imagine that as a consequence of the choice
reform, hospitals attempted to attract patients by improving quality along di-
mensions other than waiting times and mortality, and hence this would lead to a
change in patient preferences over unobserved hospital quality. We believe that
the scope for such behavior in the UK market was very limited in the period we
42For example, Goeree (2008) assumes that advertising (and interactions of advertising with demo-
graphics) only enters the constraining process, but not utility. Other variables such as price and physical
product characteristics only affect utility but not the consideration set formation. Similar, Mehta, Rajiv
and Srinivasan (2003) model consideration set formation to be a function of whether the product is
displayed or featured and familiarity with the store, whereas utility is a function of product dummies
and price.
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study. Hospitals did not market themselves directly to patients. Published data
on performance from the regulatory bodies focused on waiting times and clin-
ical quality. Any changes in unobserved (to the econometrician) quality would
have had to be observable to patients or referring physicians in the absence of ac-
tive marketing activities by hospitals. By contrast, mortality and waiting times,
which we do observe, are highly salient indicators. And while mortality may not
be known by the patient, it is relatively easy to observe and interpret by the
referring physician, who can then communicate this information to the patient.
Endogeneity of Waiting Time and Quality of Service
Finally, the endogeneity of waiting times and mortality in the utility function
(4) is a potential concern. First, it is possible that unobservably better hospitals
may have longer waiting times because they attract more patients. By increasing
aggregate demand, higher unobserved quality from the patient’s (ξj) or physi-
cian’s perspective (ζj) will lead to longer waiting times, so Corr(Wjt, ξj) 6= 0 (or
Corr(Wjt, ζj) 6= 0) implies that we will be unable to obtain a consistent esti-
mate of the effect of waiting times on hospital choice (βw,i) without addressing
this issue. The issue is very similar to the endogeneity of the price coefficient
commonly encountered in the empirical literature in industrial organization. In
that context, products with higher unobserved quality will have greater demand,
which in turn leads to higher prices. An analogous mechanism will drive waiting
times up in the fixed price (and capacity constrained) environment of the English
NHS. In other words, rationing through waiting times plays a similar role to the
price mechanism in other markets. This will lead to waiting times being positively
correlated with unobserved hospital quality.
Second, a related concern also applies to our measure for quality of service,
because hospitals which treat a larger number of cases might also exhibit higher
quality. Such a relationship between volume and quality is well established and is
likely to also apply to our setting.43 The volume-quality channel is problematic in
our context, because hospitals with higher unobserved quality will attract more
patients, which in turn will lead to higher quality and hence a correlation of
quality of service (mortality rate) with unobserved quality ξj (ζj).
In principle these endogeneity problems can be addressed either by using instru-
mental variables or by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects
to absorb the variation in unobserved quality. As there are no obvious good
instruments for waiting times and quality of service, we employ a fixed effects
approach.44 Specifically, we estimate a separate hospital fixed effect as part of
both patient and physician utility. This allows for unobserved hospital quality
43There is a very large literature on the “volume-outcome” relationship in health care. Some papers
from that literature are Birkmeyer et al. (2002), Silber et al. (2010), and Halm, Lee and Chassin (2002).
44One could consider employing the commonly used strategy of using values of the endogenous vari-
able(s) from another (product or geographic) market. For example, we could consider using waiting times
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to differentially affect the pre- and post-reform periods, since quality effects on
physician utility affect choice only in the pre-reform period.45
V. Reduced-Form Evidence
Before proceeding to the structural analysis, we look at patterns in the data
to provide some simple empirical evidence on whether patients became more
responsive to hospital quality after the reform. We start by running a simple
linear regression of aggregate market shares on mortality rates to examine the
impact of the introduction of choice on the responsiveness of market shares to
the mortality rate. This allows us to illustrate some of the main patterns in the
data in a simple way. We aggregate the patient-level data to the hospital-quarter
level. The mortality rate is also defined at this level. We estimate separate OLS
regressions with hospital fixed effects for the pre- and post-reform time periods.
The results are reported in Table 3, columns (1) and (2). These show that pre-
reform higher quality hospitals did not have significantly larger market shares.
Post-reform, however, a lower mortality rate is significantly associated with a
higher market share. This provides initial suggestive evidence that the elasticity
of demand with respect to quality rose due to the introduction of choice. It is
possible that this relation has nothing to do with choice but is an artifact of
the distribution of market shares and mortality rates, which are unrelated to the
introduction of patient choice. We test this by implementing a placebo test in
which we replicate the same regressions of columns (1) and (2) using emergency
CABG cases instead of elective ones. Choice does not play a role for emergency
admissions: patients are simply taken to the nearest suitable facility. Therefore, if
we see a change in the correlation of market shares with mortality for emergency
admissions, it should not be due to the reform. Examining the results in Table
3, columns (3) and (4), we see that hospital mortality rates have no statistically
significant impact on emergency CABG market shares either pre- or post-reform.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
An alternative way of analyzing the issue of an increased sensitivity of demand
for other procedures at the same hospital as instruments. As a robustness check we implemented such an
approach and find that our results are robust to instrumenting CABG waiting times (on top of including
hospital fixed effects) with waiting times for other procedures (due to the non-linearity of the demand
model, we implement this regression via a control function approach). However, these instruments are
not without problems, as unobserved quality may be correlated across procedures. For instance, general
hospital reputation might affect demand similarly across procedures. Furthermore, such an IV strategy
is harder to implement for mortality rates, since quality measures are more difficult to compare across
different procedures. See for example Gravelle et al. (2012). In addition, NHS hospitals do not operate in
multiple, widely dispersed locations. Therefore the common strategy of using values of the endogenous
variable from a distant market is not a good fit for our situation.
45We note that ideally we would want to control for unobserved quality even more rigorously by includ-
ing a separate fixed effect for each hospital/quarter combination. However, other hospital characteristics,
namely waiting times and the mortality rate, are defined at this level and there impact on choice would
hence not be identified if hospital/quarter fixed effects were included.
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is to look directly at the expected (hospital-level) mortality rate that the average
patient faces. In the first row of Table 4 we report the average mortality rate a
patient faces pre- and post-reform. We find a substantial fall of about 30 percent
(0.4 percentage points) in the mortality rate post-reform. This fall might occur
for a number of reasons. For example, it could be due to a secular downward
trend in the mortality rate across all hospitals, or to hospitals in high population
areas improving more (so more patients are treated at better facilities without
necessarily exercising choice), or to patients deliberately choosing higher quality
hospitals.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
To try to identify the impact of choice, we report the change in the mortality
rate separately for patients who visited the nearest hospital and patients who by-
passed the nearest hospital and traveled further. If the drop in average mortality
is simply due to an overall downward secular trend, we should not see differences
in mortality between patients who visited the nearest hospital and those who
bypassed it. Similarly, if the decrease in mortality is due to the fact that pa-
tients simply had better hospitals closer by after the reform, we should see most
of the drop explained by the group of patients who visited the nearest hospital.
Examining the patterns in Table 4 we find that the opposite is true. The drop
in mortality among patients bypassing the nearest hospital is more than twice
as large as the drop for patients who visit the nearest hospital. In other words,
we observe larger declines in mortality for patients who decide not to use their
local hospital. Consistent with the results in Table 3, this supports the idea that
these patients were not simply lucky that the local hospital improved its quality
but, rather, that they sought better hospitals once they were allowed a choice of
provider.
These patterns in the data provide some initial evidence suggesting that the
introduction of patient choice via the reform increased the responsiveness of de-
mand to cross-hospital differences in quality.
VI. Estimation Results: Structural Model
We first report the estimation results from our model of choice and constraints,
then report how they translate into patient and hospital level elasticities of de-
mand.
A. Parameter Estimates
The results from the estimation are reported in Table 5. For economy of expo-
sition, the (large number of) fixed effect estimates are not reported. We find that
patients care about distance to the hospital and both of the distance coefficients
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are highly significant in the patient utility function. The results also show that
patients dislike higher mortality rates, i.e., lower quality. The effect is stronger
for more severely ill patients as well as for lower income groups. The latter ef-
fect, however, is only significant at the 10 percent level. In terms of sensitivity
to waiting times, we find an insignificant effect for low severity and low income
patients. There is some evidence that higher income households care less about
waiting times.46
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
In terms of physician preferences, we find that both distance terms as well as
the within-PCT dummy are highly significant. We also find that most patients are
severely, in fact fully, constrained before the reform took place. For low severity
cases (regardless of income) λ is estimated to be equal to zero, which implies that
no choice was offered by the physician and patient preferences did not influence
referrals. Only for high severity cases do we find a positive coefficient on λ.
B. Elasticities of Demand
As the primary focus on the paper is on the quality of care and we find only
weak (mostly insignificant) results for sensitivity with respect to waiting times
post-reform, we focus on the elasticity of demand with respect to the mortality
rate. We start by computing elasticities for individual patients with respect to
the mortality rate. Analyzing individual-level elasticities is helpful in our context
to get a better sense of how strongly different patient groups were affected by the
relaxation of the constraint on choice. We then compute hospital-level demand
elasticities (by aggregating up changes in individual choice probabilities) to assess
the impact on the demand faced by hospitals.
Patient-level Elasticities and Consideration Set Size
Panel A of Table 6 reports the sensitivity of choice probabilities to changes
in the mortality rate for different groups of patients pre- and post-reform. Boot-
strapped standard errors are in parentheses. To simulate patient-level elasticities,
46The lack of an effect of waiting times is probably due to the large fall in waiting times that occurred
just prior to the full roll out of the choice program in 2006. In 2001 the government instituted an
aggressive national policy (dubbed “targets and terror”) to reduce waiting times which had considerable
success in lowering waiting times before the choice reforms (Propper et al. 2010) and may have meant
that waiting times became less salient to patients. See also Gutacker et al. (2015) who find no effect
of waiting times on demand for hip replacement surgery in England between 2010 and 2013. Beckert,
Christensen and Collyer (2012) do find an effect of waiting times, but for a much simpler orthopaedic
procedure for which mortality rates are very low. Our estimated net effect of waiting times for high
income patients (i.e. adding the waiting time coefficient and the interaction of waiting times and high
income) is positive, but only marginally significant (p-value 0.055). This either means that high income
patients prefer longer waits (perhaps in order to arrange their affairs before entering hospital), or may
indicate some residual endogeneity.
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we compute a one standard deviation shift in the mortality rate for each hospital
and compute the change in choice probabilities entailed by this change for each
patient in the relevant time period. We then average the changes across patients
and hospitals. We also compute the average consideration set size pre-reform to
give a sense of how constrained patients were in their choices. To examine the
impact of patient characteristics, we simulate the reactions of all patients pre-
and post-reform to a quality change for all four possible permutations of severity
and income. (For each simulation we set all patients to have the same charac-
teristics.) This allows us to isolate elasticity differences that are due to patient
characteristics from any other factors, such as geographic location, that might be
correlated with patient characteristics.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The first column shows that, pre-reform, choice was fully constrained for low
severity patients regardless of income. This leads to a complete lack of respon-
siveness of referrals to quality for this group of patients, as shown in the second
column. For high severity cases, irrespective of income, choices were not fully
constrained. High severity patients in both income groups were offered an aver-
age of 1.61 hospitals. This leads to a non-zero, but small, sensitivity to quality
pre-reform. The third column shows that the liberation of choice has a substan-
tial impact for all four demographic groups. Sensitivity changes by 1.2 for low
severity and low income cases and by 1.5 for high severity and low income cases.
The respective increases for high income cases are of the order of 0.6 and 0.9.
Post-reform, higher income households have a lower sensitivity to quality than
low income households. Interestingly, in contrast to fears that choice-based re-
forms harm individuals from lower income groups (see Cookson, Laudicella and
Donni 2013), our analysis suggests that households from more deprived areas
benefitted slightly more from the reform.
Hospital-level Elasticities
To assess the impact of the choice reform on the quality provision by hospi-
tals, the hospital-level elasticities are the most crucial factor. If the demand
that hospitals face becomes more elastic with regard to quality, then relaxing the
constraints on choice was successful in increasing hospitals’ incentives to provide
higher quality. We examine hospital-level demand sensitivity by simulating a one
standard deviation change in mortality for each hospital in the choice set and
computing the percentage change in the hospital’s market share. The responsive-
ness to a change in mortality differs across hospitals as a function of the density of
patients in the local area, the demographic composition of the local population,
and the locations of other hospitals. Panel B of Table 6 reports the distribution
of elasticities across all hospitals.
The first column shows that when constraints on choice are relaxed post-reform
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a one standard deviation increase in the mortality rate leads to a 4.46 percent
drop in market share for the average hospital. This compares to a much smaller
decrease of 0.82 percent before the reform. The standard errors indicate this
change is statistically significant. The highest quartile of the elasticity distri-
bution pre-reform lies below the lowest post-reform. The distribution of hospital
elasticities also shows substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across
hospitals. The additional market share loss after the reform is 4.37 at the 25th
percentile and 2.04 at the 75th percentile of the distribution of elasticity changes.
Overall, the results suggest that relaxing the constraints on choice substantially
increased hospitals’ incentives to improve quality. In percentage terms, demand at
the average hospital became over five times more responsive to quality. While the
magnitude of the elasticity is not especially large in absolute terms, the reform
led to a large increase in demand responsiveness from what had been a very
low level. Further, there is large heterogeneity in the effect: many hospitals
experienced substantial changes in the demand elasticities they faced.
VII. Policy Evaluation
We provide an evaluation of the impact of allowing free choice in several steps.
We first estimate the number of lives that were saved by allocating patients to
better hospitals post-reform and analyze the consumer welfare gains due to the
relaxation of choice constraints. These calculations evaluate effects of the reform
under the assumption that hospitals did not react to the change in demand con-
ditions, so the survival and welfare gains are purely due to sorting of patients
across hospitals. We then proceed to an analysis of how much the competitive
environment changed with the introduction of the reform. Finally, we provide ev-
idence which shows that hospitals seem to have reacted to the change in demand
conditions as intended by policy makers.
In all but the last step, we simulate counterfactuals in order to quantify the
impact of increased choice. Contrary to many other applications in the empir-
ical industrial organization literature, we do not simulate changes caused by a
hypothetical policy, but instead simulate behavior for the post-reform population
under the assumption that the reform had not taken place. This allows us to
leverage the structure of our model to evaluate and quantify the effects of the
policy change.
A. The Impact of Choice on Patient Survival
An obvious and very direct measure by which to evaluate the policy is the im-
pact on the probability of survival following a CABG. We assess this by calculating
how many more patients would have died had the reform not been implemented,
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i.e., if patients in the post-reform time period were still subject to pre-reform
choice constraints and therefore choosing according to pre-reform parameters.
Formally, we implement the analysis in the following way. The ex-ante mortality
probability of any particular patient i in time-period t is given by
E(MortalityUNCONi ) =
∑
j
PrUNCONij (Ωpatient) · E(Mortalityi|Choice = j)
E(MortalityCONi ) =
∑
j
PrCONij (Ωpatient,Ωphysician) · E(Mortalityi|Choice = j)
where the two rows define the mortality probability under unconstrained and
constrained choice respectively.47 Note that the two expressions differ only in the
choice probability. The first term in both equations denotes the probability of
visiting hospital j, which can be computed from the demand model estimates.
For the case of unconstrained choice this is determined by patient preferences.
In the constrained case physician preferences together with patient preferences
influence choice. Mortalityi denotes an indicator variable which is equal to one
if the patient dies during the surgery. The second term in both lines denotes the
conditional mean of this variable, which is equal to the hospital-specific mortality
rate.48
To obtain the expected difference in mortality across all patients we compute
E(∆Mortalitytotal) =
∑
i∈PostReform
[
E(MortalityCONi )− E(MortalityUNCONi )
]
In other words, we sum the changes in mortality probability for each patient
in the post-reform period when choice is constrained relative to when there are
no constraints. The latter constitutes the actual state of the world post-reform
while the former is a counterfactual scenario in which the reform never happened
and constraints are still in place.
The results are reported in Table 7, Panel A. We estimate that 4.2 fewer patients
would have survived had the reform not been implemented in 2005. This number
is calculated over the entire five post-reform quarters used in the estimation and
47In this context we think of the ex-ante probability as the probability of death before both the error
terms of the choice process and the error term influencing survival are realized, i.e. the patient has
not decided which hospital to visit and we do not yet know the patient-specific shock to the mortality
outcome.
48The hospital-specific mortality rate is identical to the mortality variable used as quality indicator
Zjt in the demand model.
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corresponds to 3.3 lives saved on a annual basis. The changes amount to about
0.02 percentage points or a 3 percent decrease in the mortality rate in the relevant
time period. If we adopt the $100,000 benchmark of Cutler and McClellan (2001)
for the value of a year of life, and assume that CABG survivors’ lives are extended
by 17 years (van Domburg, Kappetein and Bogers 2009), the beneficial effects of
the pro-competition reforms are about $5.6 million per year in terms of value of
life-years saved.49
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
B. Changes in Patient Welfare
Next we compute the welfare changes due to the removal of restrictions on
choice. We simulate a post-reform scenario where the constraints are still in place
as the counterfactual. The comparison with the unconstrained choice scenario
allows us to quantify the welfare effect of the reform on the post-reform pool
of patients. Expected consumer surplus (in utils) for consumer i when choice is
unconstrained can be expressed using the standard formula:
E(SurplusUNCONi ) = E[maxj∈J(U ij + εij)]
For the case of constrained choice utility is still given by the same patient
utility function but choices are now determined by both patient preferences and
the constraining forces of the physician’s influence on the referral. Expected
utility is equal to:
E(SurplusCONi ) = E[maxj∈CSi(U ij + εij)]
This expression differs from the unconstrained case only in the choice rule: the
chosen hospital is the utility maximizing hospital from the constraint set CSi
rather than the full set J .50
Due to the iid extreme value assumption on the error term (see Small and
Rosen 1981, Train 2003) we can re-write the surplus expressions above (up to an
arbitrary constant) as a logit-inclusive value:
493.3× 17× 100, 000 = 5, 610, 000
50As before, J denotes the set of all CABG performing hospitals in the UK and is therefore not
patient-specific. The constraint set CSi instead is specific to patient i.
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E(SurplusUNCONi ) = ln
∑
j∈J
exp(U ij)
E(SurplusCONi ) = ln
∑
j∈CSi
exp(U ij)
The welfare calculation for the unconstrained case is standard and the expres-
sion above can be computed directly from the patient utility function conditional
on the estimated model parameters (see, e.g., Nevo 2003, Ho 2006). The con-
strained case is more difficult to compute because the consideration set CSi is
unobserved. We therefore simulate consideration sets conditional on our param-
eter estimates (in a similar manner as we simulated consideration sets in the
estimation). Specifically, we simulate the physician taste shocks (νij) that de-
termine which hospitals are included in CSi. For a given set of draws, we then
compute the associated consideration set and the expected surplus derived from
choice from this set. Averaging over draws allows us to compute the expected
surplus for each patient i.
The average change in surplus per patient is simply equal to the difference
between the two expressions above, averaged across patients:
E(∆Surplusi) =
1
#PatientsPostReform
∑
i∈PostReform
E(SurplusUNCONi )−E(SurplusCONi )
where #PatientsPostReform denotes the total number of referrals in the post-
reform time-period.
We find that the freeing of choice led to an average increase of 1.04 units in
expected utility.51 Since there is no price mechanism in this market (and therefore
no price coefficient in the demand model) we cannot directly translate the welfare
change from utils into a dollar value. However, we can express the gain in terms
of the hospital characteristics in the utility function. If we compare the gains
to the preferences over distance, we find that the welfare effect of the reform
corresponds to a 15 kilometer reduction in travel distance.52 This corresponds to
around half of the average travel distance of 30 kilometers reported in Table 2. We
51Our calculations are for impacts on consumer welfare alone, not social welfare. Nonetheless, we note
that these calculations assume the same amount of spending for CABGs under the counterfactual as
the actual post-reform patterns. This is likely to be the situation. Since there is no difference between
the actual post-reform case and the counterfactual in the number of CABG cases, and since the fixed
payment per CABG case is the same across hospitals, there is no difference in total spending between
the actual post-reform case and the counterfactual.
521.04/(−6.98) = −0.149, where −6.98 is the coefficient on distance in the patient utility function.
Distance in the regression is defined in units of 100 kilometers.
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then translate the welfare estimates into a dollar value using additional data from
outside of the model. A back of the envelope calculation to monetize the implied
travel time reduction yields a welfare effect of approximately $6,226 per person.53
We note that a similar calculation based on mortality rates and the statistical
value of life yields a much larger value ($300,900 per person) and we therefore
remain cautious with respect to the reliability of the monetary conversion.54
Relative to the change in survival reported above, the welfare calculation pro-
vides a much broader assessment of the impact of the reform on patients. All
components of consumer preferences including quality, waiting times, distance,
as well as hospital fixed effects and idiosyncratic patient taste shocks are sup-
pressed by the pre-reform constraints. Hence when constraints are removed, the
patient’s ability to choose based on her preferences leads to an increase in welfare.
To further understand the source of the welfare change, we proceed to decompose
the impacts of the different utility components that are suppressed by the choice
constraints. We implement the decomposition by imposing counterfactual con-
straints to patient choice that are aligned or misaligned with patient preferences
along various dimensions in order to isolate the impact of freeing up choice on
the different components of patient preferences.
In a first step we take the estimated physician utility function, but replace
the hospital fixed effects in his utility function with the patient’s set of hospital
fixed effects. We then estimate the welfare impact of post-reform patients being
constrained by a physician with these preferences. Relative to the previous welfare
comparison, the welfare decrease from imposing the constraints has to be smaller
now, because the constraints are less “hurtful” to the patient due to the fact that
patient and physician utility are more aligned and hence the physician is more
likely to offer a hospital that the patient would have chosen herself. Comparing
the welfare change due to the removal of constraints in this case with our baseline
welfare change calculation, we find that the change is 17 percent smaller. Hence
17 percent of the welfare change is due to the patient being able to react to her
preference over hospitals’ unobserved quality.
Next, we further align physician and patient preferences by endowing the physi-
53The UK Department of Transport estimates that it takes approximately 4 minutes
to travel a mile in the ten largest areas in Britain during the time period of our study
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110507043012/http://dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/
datatablespublications/roads/congestion/urban/cgn0301.xls. This translates into approximately
37 minutes to travel 15km (9.32 miles). Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) estimate from that a
1 minute increase in travel time to hospitals reduces consumer surplus by $167. Applying this to the
travel time yields a welfare effect of $6,226.14 per person.
54Taking into account heterogeneity in the mortality coefficient, we calculate an average per patient
gain in units of mortality (measured between 0 and 1) of 0.177. Multiplying by the value of a statistical
life ($100,000 per life year × 17 additional years of life, as before) gives us 0.177×100, 000×17 = 300, 900.
Fundamentally, the reason this number differs from the number derived from travel distance is because
there is no price coefficient in our model (since NHS care is free of charge). As a consequence, the back
of the envelope estimates differ due to differences in the numbers we import to monetize the welfare gain,
as well as differences in the distance and mortality rate parameter estimates in our model.
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cian with the same preferences over distance, waiting time, mortality and unob-
served quality as the patient. Thus the only remaining difference between the
two parties are their idiosyncratic taste shocks. Aligning the deterministic part
of utility in this way further reduces the welfare change from removing the con-
straints by 11 percent. The remaining (residual) difference in welfare with and
without constraints constitutes 72 percent of the total welfare change and is due
to the patient’s ability to respond to her idiosyncratic random taste shocks. Id-
iosyncratic taste shocks could be, for example, whether a hospital is located near
to a patient’s family members, or if a patient particularly values being treated by
a surgeon at a particular hospital.
C. Change in the Competitive Environment
The welfare analysis and the change in survival calculate only the changes that
are achieved by reallocating patients, i.e. they do not take into account any supply
side adjustments by hospitals to the new demand conditions. We now examine the
further improvements that could be achieved if the reform also provided incentives
for hospitals to improve quality.
First, we undertake a counterfactual calculation to get a sense of the magnitude
of the relaxation of choice constraints on hospitals’ incentives. We look at how hos-
pital market shares in the pre-reform period would have been different if patient
choices had occurred without constraints, i.e., using the estimated post-reform
parameters. This allows us to compute how much re-shuﬄing of market shares
would have happened had patients had free choice earlier. When implementing
this counterfactual, we hold everything fixed except for the choice parameters. In
other words, the same set of patients is exposed to the same set of hospitals as
in the actual pre-reform choice situation. We do not allow hospitals to adjust to
the changes in demand caused by the removal of constraints. Holding hospital
quality fixed is helpful because any movement we see in market shares in actual
post-reform referrals will be due to both demand changes and hospitals’ responses
to these. Our counterfactual allows us to isolate the former effect to assess the
pressure on hospitals from the reform, for a given quality level. The magnitude
of the re-shuﬄing of market shares is therefore a valuable metric of how much
incentives to improve quality changed for hospitals. It should also be noted that
due to the absence of an outside option the simulated changes in market shares
have to cancel out across hospitals. We are therefore quantifying a re-allocation
of a given set of patients.
To describe this, we report the change in market share at various percentiles of
the distribution of changes in Panel B of Table 7. We find that the introduction
of choice had a significant impact on many hospitals. At the 25th percentile of
the distribution hospitals would have experienced a roughly 15 percent decrease
while at the 75th percentile hospitals experienced around a 15 percent increase
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in market-share. At the mean and median, the change is close to zero due to the
fact that the changes in market-shares across hospital sum to zero.
D. Supply-Side Response
Having established that the introduction of choice led to a substantial increase
in demand elasticities faced by hospitals, we now provide some evidence for a
supply-side response to this change in the competitive environment. We expect
that hospitals in areas where demand became more elastic to improve their quality
more than other hospitals. We test this hypothesis by regressing the change in
the mortality rate on the change in hospitals’ elasticity of demand with respect
to quality.
This approach mirrors the difference-in-difference estimation conducted in Gaynor,
Moreno-Serra and Propper (2013) and Cooper et al. (2011). In these papers, a
change in the mortality rate is regressed on cross-sectional variation in hospital
market structure.55 The argument is that the expansion of choice will have a
stronger impact in areas with a higher density of competing hospitals. Using a
measure of concentration, like the Herfindahl Index, constitutes a reduced-form
way of capturing that the elasticity of demand is expected to change relatively
more in high concentration areas. Here we are instead able to compute demand
responsiveness directly from the model estimates, rather than having to use hos-
pital concentration as a proxy. We are hence able to use a more direct measure
of the change in competitive environment than the previous literature.
We use the observations on the 27 hospitals that are present in all periods of
the data and use the change in demand responsiveness reported in the lower panel
of Table 6 as the regressor.56 We estimate the following OLS regression:
∆Mortalityj = φ0 + φ1∆Elasticityj,Mortality + ej
where Elasticityj,Mortality denotes the percentage change in market share for hos-
pital j when the mortality rate is increased by one standard deviation. For ease
of interpretation, we use the absolute value of the elasticity in the regression.
We note that, due to the differenced nature of the regression, any time-invariant
factor that might differ across hospitals does not pose a threat to a causal inter-
pretation. However, any time-varying factor that is correlated with the change
in the demand elasticity could lead to a bias in the estimation. While there is
no other obvious change over time that might correlate with the change in the
competitive environment (see also the discussion in Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and
Propper (2013) and Cooper et al. (2011)) we cannot fully rule out such confounds.
55For the most part different versions of an HHI index are used in these papers. However both papers
show robustness to a host of definitions of the measure of market structure.
56There were two new entrants and one merger over our period. See footnote 26 for details.
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The results are reported in Panel C of Table 7. We find a negative and signifi-
cant impact of the change in the demand elasticity on the change in the mortality
rate. In other words, hospitals whose demand became more responsive to quality
improved quality disproportionately more than other hospitals (by lowering the
mortality rate). To get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficient, consider the
change in the demand elasticity for the median hospital, 3.09, as reported in Ta-
ble 6. This shift implies a drop of 1.01 in the mortality rate. This estimation of
the effect of the reform on mortality at the median hospital is slightly larger than
improving quality by one standard deviation in the across-hospital distribution
and suggests that freeing up patient choice elicited a supply side response by hos-
pitals that improved patient survival. In terms of magnitude, our point estimate
implies that competition could have played a significant role in the overall drop
in the CABG mortality rate from 2003 to 2007.57
We also undertake an exercise to illustrate what the welfare effect of quality
improvement due to supply side response could be. We do this by simulating
choice under the scenario that mortality rates had not changed due to the reform.
In order to obtain counterfactual mortality rates in the absence of the reform, we
assume that the change in mortality for each hospital is equal to the intercept in
the regression above, φ0. We hence assume that without the reform, no change
in elasticity would have taken place and therefore ∆Elasticityj,Mortality = 0,
which implies that the expected change in mortality does not depend on the slope
parameter φ1. We then simulate the change in welfare when applying constraints
to the post-reform patients (as we did in Section VII.B) and setting the mortality
rates to the higher counterfactual levels. We find a decrease in welfare that is 8
percent larger than the welfare change computed earlier from only the removal of
constraints.58 This provides evidence that there is a further component of welfare
improvements due to the supply-side reaction to the reform.
While these results are interesting, they do not come from a formal model
of supply-side behavior and are based on only 27 observations. We therefore
regard them as suggestive. To fully explore the supply response we would need
to estimate a fully specified structural model including the supply side: we leave
this for future research.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper takes advantage of a “natural experiment” in the English National
Health Service that introduced patient choice among hospitals to examine the
57We note that a volume-outcome effect (as discussed earlier) would lead the estimates to go the other
way, since high mortality hospitals are those with the largest changes in their elasticities and the biggest
improvement in quality. Therefore to the extent there is a volume-outcome effect, we may underestimate
the supply response to the reform.
58The welfare calculation in Section VII.B was based on a simulated removal of constraints, holding
mortality rates constant.
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effect on patient behavior and supplier responses to that behavioral change. We
evaluate whether increased choice resulted in increased elasticity of demand faced
by hospitals with regard to two central dimensions of hospital service: clinical
quality of care and waiting times. Using detailed patient-level data, we estimate
a structural model of patient choices and constraints. On the methodological side
we show how to explicitly model the choice constraints imposed by the pre-reform
referral system.
We find substantial impacts of the removal of restrictions on patient choice. Pa-
tients are more responsive to the clinical quality of care at hospitals. Most patient
groups are not more responsive to waiting times. There is, however, heterogeneity
in these impacts. The more severely ill and those from low income areas bene-
fit more from the removal of constraints. This increased demand responsiveness
alone led to a reduction in mortality and an increase in patient welfare. The
elasticity of demand faced by hospitals also increased post-reform. This gave
hospitals incentives to improve their quality of care and we find evidence that
hospitals responded strongly to the enhanced incentives due to increased demand
elasticity.
Overall, this paper provides evidence that a reform that removed constraints
on patient choice worked: patient flows were more sensitive to clinical quality and
patients went to better hospitals. And, in contrast to fears that these pro-choice
reforms would only benefit the better off, we find no evidence of this. This suggests
that there is potential for choice based reforms to succeed and for competition in
health care to enhance quality.
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics — Hospital Characteristics
Total Waiting Times Mortality
Admissions (Days) Rate
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
2003 497.7 178.4 109.1 32.1 1.32 0.62
2004 486.8 194.9 100.5 20.7 1.42 0.69
2005 423.8 153.9 67.8 15.2 1.25 0.52
2006 385.5 160.3 65.6 17.3 1.52 0.81
2007 419.9 146.7 64.9 21.4 0.99 1.02
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics for all hospitals performing CABGs from 2003 to 2007.
To compute the columns in the table, the hospital-year level values of the variables are calculated. The
means and standard deviations are based purely on between-hospital variation within each year.
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), UK Department of Health.
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Table 2—Descriptive Statistics — Patient Characteristics
Standard 10th 90th
Mean Median Deviation Percentile Percentile
Age 65.76 66 55.04 53 76
Fraction Male 0.81
Index of Multiple Deprivation 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.31
Comorbidity Count 5.42 5 2.81 2 9
Charlson Index 0.55 0 0.71 0 2
Distance Pre-reform 34.93 22.34 44.97 4.77 71.40
Distance Post-reform 32.24 22.91 32.94 4.93 70.58
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), UK Department of Health.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FREE TO CHOOSE? 45
Table 3—Reduced-Form Evidence: Regressions using Aggregate Market-shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Elective CABGs Emergency CABG
Market-share Market-share
Time Period Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Mortality Rate -0.001 -0.177 0.031 -0.046
Coefficient (0.047) (0.034) (0.066) (0.053)
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142 143 142 143
Hospitals 29 29 29 29
Quarters 5 5 5 5
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4—Reduced-Form Evidence: Changes in the Expected Mortality Rate
Mean Mortality Mean Mortality Difference
Sample Rate Pre-reform Rate Post-reform in Means
All Patients 1.330 0.935 -0.395
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Patients Visiting 1.276 1.027 -0.249
the Nearest Hospital (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Patients Not Visiting 1.445 0.735 -0.711
the Nearest Hospital (0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 5—Structural Parameter Estimates
Standard
Coefficient Error
Patient Distance -6.983 0.211
Preferences
Closest Hospital Dummy 1.341 0.052
Mortality Rate -7.883 2.229
Mortality Rate * High Severity -5.419 2.467
Mortality Rate * High Income 3.832 2.320
Waiting Times -1.528 1.887
Waiting Times * High Severity -1.584 1.140
Waiting Times * High Income 6.262 1.196
Physician Distance -4.985 0.207
Preferences
Closest Hospital Dummy 1.734 0.110
Within-PCT Dummy 1.309 0.308
Choice Constant 0.000 0.119
Constraint
Parameters High Severity 1.011 0.178
High Income 0.000 0.113
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Table 6—Sensitivity of Demand with Respect to Quality
Panel A
Patient-level Consideration Sensitivity Sensitivity
Sensitivity Set Size to Quality to Quality
(by characteristics) (Pre-reform) Pre-reform Post-reform
Low Severity, Low Income 1 0 -1.209
(0.037) (0.041) (0.317)
Low Severity, High Income 1 0 -0.637
(0.056) (0.035) (0.272)
High Severity, Low Income 1.611 -0.486 -1.972
(0.110) (0.090) (0.354)
High Severity, High Income 1.611 -0.354 -1.438
(0.108) (0.083) (0.323)
Panel B
Hospital-level
Sensitivity Mean Standard 25th Median 75th
Deviation Percentile Percentile
Pre-reform -0.82 0.65 -1.33 -0.56 -0.30
(0.17)
Post-reform -4.46 2.57 -6.53 -3.69 -2.38
(0.70)
Change -3.50 1.97 -4.37 -3.09 -2.04
(0.60)
Note: The top panel reports the pre-reform consideration set size and the responsiveness of demand at
the patient-level with respect to the mortality rate. The values reported in the second and third column
represent the average percentage change in the choice probability when a hospital increases the mortality
rate by one standard deviation. The bottom panel reports the distribution of percentage changes (across
all hospitals) in market share when a hospital increases the mortality rate by one standard deviation.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7—Policy Evaluation
Panel A
Impact on Patient Change in Survivals when -4.17
Survival Post-reform Choices are Constrained
Post-Reform Admissions 14,968
(5 quarters) Deaths 140
Mortality Rate 0.94
Recomputed Mortality Rate
Under Constraints 0.96
Panel B
Percentage Change in
Market Shares Mean Standard 25th Median 75th
Due to the Reform Deviation Percentile Percentile
-3.77 22.83 -15.92 2.14 13.49
Panel C
Supply-side Dependent Variable Change in
Response Mortality Rate
Change in the Elasticity -0.328
of Demand with Respect (0.128)
to the Mortality Rate
Observations 27
Note: Panel A reports the change in the number of survivals when constraints are removed. Panel B
shows the changes in market-shares across hospitals for the counterfactual scenario of an earlier removal of
constraints. This entails a zero-sum game of market-share reshuﬄing between hospitals. The distribution
of changes across hospitals is reported. Panel C reports results from an OLS regression of a change in
mortality on the change in the elasticity of demand (derived from the demand model).
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